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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STERLING B. CANNON, GEORGE 
H. MAXWELL, DAVE DAVIS, ART 
VAN LUYK, and TERRY TEEPLES, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
STEVENS SCHOOLS OF BUSINESS, 
INC., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 14378 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
AND SUPPORTING BRIEF 
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
Stevens Schools of Business, Inc., defendant and appel-
lant herein, respectfully petitions the court for a re-hearing 
on the following grounds: 
1. A justice of the court who did not hear the oral 
argument should not have participated in the decision. 
2. The court misconceived the facts in stating that 
amounts claimed by the plaintiffs were payable from a special 
fund. 
3. The court failed to consider the authorities relied 
upon by the appellant and failed to decide the primary issue 
in the case. 
4. The court's holding with respect to accord and 
satisfaction violated accepted principles of contract inter-
pretation. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action by five former employees against 
an employer for commissions claimed to have accrued after the 
employer ceased doing business. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs 
and against defendant for $35,329.74. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
Defendant and appellant asks the court to grant its pe-
tition for re-hearing, set the case for reargument, and 
reverse the judgment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs were employed by the defendant as salesmen, 
whose duties included visiting various high schools and en-
rolling students (Tr. 14). In December 1973, the defendant 
closed the school it had been operating in Salt Lake City, 
and sold the assets of the school it was operating in Ogden. 
Thereafter the plaintiffs brought this action claiming they 
were entitled to the commissions they would have earned if 
the defendant had continued operation of the two schools. 
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Prior to the bringing of the action, three of the 
plaintiffs had endorsed and cashed checks which were ten-
dered to them in full payment of any claims against the 
defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
A justice of the court who did not hear the oral argument 
should not have participated in the decision. 
In accordance with the rule of the court, oral argument 
was requested, and the court convened on December 17, 1976, to 
hear the argument. At that time, the court was composed of 
Chief Justice Henriod and Justices Crockett, Ellett, Maughan, 
and Wilkins. Justice Henriod, however, did not participate 
in the decision and Justice Hall did. Article VIII, Section 
2, Utah Constitution, provides: 
The Supreme Court shall consist of five judges, 
which number may be increased or decreased by the 
legislature, but no alteration or increase shall have 
the effect of removing a judge from office. A major-
ity of the judgdes constituting the court shall be 
necessary to form a quorum or render a decision. If 
a justice of the Supreme Court shall be disqualified 
from sitting in a case before said court, the remain-
ing judges shall call a district judge to sit with 
them on the hearing of such cause. * *.* (Emphasis added) 
At the time of the argument, Cheif Justice Henriod had 
announced his retirement from the court, and it might have been 
anticipated that he would not participate in the decision. That 
being the case, he should have disqualified himself from sitting 
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and the court should have followed the mandate of Article VIII, 
Section 2, and appointed a district judge to sit with them on 
the hearing of the case. 
The failure to appoint a district judge deprived the appel-
lant of the right to have all of the judges participate in the 
decision-making process, and in the give and take following 
oral argument of the cause. For this reason, the court should 
grant a petition for re-hearing and permit the parties to 
argue the case before all of the justices who will participate 
in the decision. 
1 1 
The court misconceived the facts in stating that amounts 
claimed by the plaintiffs were payable from a special fund. 
In its opinion, this court cited Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. 
v. Moore, 170 Colo. 539, 463 P.2d 460, 462 (1970), in sup-
port of the proposition that where compensation for services 
rendered is to be paid out of a fund to be collected by the 
party for whom such services were rendered "there is an 
implied obligation on the part of the promisor to exercise 
reasonable diligence to collect the fund from which the 
promisees may be compensated for such services." 
The Navajo Freight Line case is not in point. In that 
case the defendant had agreed to pay his auditors a percentage 
of the additional accounts receivable collected as a result of 
certain work done by the auditors. The auditors brought 
••.".•':•'" - r 4 - ' -
suit seeking recovery of a percentage of all of the accounts 
that it had retrieved for the defendant to collect. The 
court, in passing, recited the language set out above, but 
held for the defendant. 
In this case there was no fund which the defendant had 
any right to collect. The student enrollments taken by the 
defendant were quarter-by-quarter, and there was no indebted-
ness owed by any of the students for whom the plaintiffs seek 
compensation. Therefore the "special fund" concept has no 
application to this case. 
Moreover, the court states bluntly that the action of the 
defendant in suspending the schools was "voluntary." This is 
a question of fact which should be sent to the trial court for 
determination. The voluntariness of the defendant's action is 
subject to serious dispute. During the year 197 3, the year 
the Salt Lake City school was closed and the Ogden school 
sold, the defendant had suffered an operational loss of $143,000 
(Tr. 262). Closing the doors of the schools under these circum-
stances can hardly be considered to be "voluntary," but should 
be deemed to be compelled by the force of circumstances over 
which the defendant had no control. At the very least, this 
is an issue that should be given back to the trial court for 
a finding. 
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Ill 
The court failed to consider the authorities relied upon 
by the appellant and failed to decide the primary issue in the 
case. \ . 
In presenting this case to the court, the defendant relied 
on a series of cases that were directly in point. People of 
the State of Illinois v. Peoria Life Insurance Co. (Harwick v. 
O'Hern), 376 111. 517, 34 N.E.2d 829, 136 A.L.R. 151 (1941); 
Layton v. Illinois Life Insurance Co. (Backman v. Davis), 81 
F.2d 600 (7 Cir. 1936); Moore v. Security Trust and Life 
Insurance Company, 168 F 496 (8 Cir. 1909); and others. 
The above cases dealt specifically with the primary 
issue in this case: whether a company which has promised 
renewal commissions to salesmen is obligated to continue to 
pay those commissions if the company goes out of business. 
As pointed out by the court in Moore v. Security Trust and 
Life Insurance Company: 
The existence of this right in the defendant [to 
manage, control, continue, or terminate its business 
at will] and its free and continuous exercise were im-
plied in this contract of agency, and the plaintifffs 
took the chances of its exercise when they signed the 
agreement and entered upon their service under it. 
In writing its decision this court ignored the whole 
theory upon which the defendant's appeal was based, and in 
so doing it did not mention a single one of the cases upon 
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which the defendant relied, let alone attempt to distinguish 
them or show the basis for their non-applicability. Instead, 
the court relied upon some general but inappropriate language 
about excuse of conditions and voluntary acts* 
' • • •
 I V
 ' 
The court's holding with respect to accord and satisfac-
tion violated accepted principles of contract interpretation. 
In ruling upon the issue of accord and satisfaction, 
the court announced a rule which will have the effect of 
returning litigants to the era of Groucho Marx, where they 
win the prize only if they happen to say the magic word. 
Checks sent to three of the plaintiffs contained the 
following endorsements: 
Endorsement of this check constitutes acknowledge-
ment of the termination effective 12-31-73, of my em-
ployment agreement with Stevens-Henager College dated 
[date], and constitutes final and full payment by 
Stevens-Henager College to me in settlement of any and 
all obligation due me from Stevens-Henager College, 
(Emphasis added) 
Citing Hintze v. Seaich, 20 Utah 2d 275, 283, 437 P.2d 
202 (1968), the court stated that: 
Neither by the statement on the check or by 
other communication did defendant express the in-
tention the payment was offered upon the condition 
that it be accepted in full satisfaction or not at 
all. 
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In the present case, the only way it could have been 
plainer that the check was tendered in full satisfaction or 
not at all would have been to add the magic words, "This 
check may be accepted only in full satisfaction or not at 
all." But rules of contract interpretation have never 
required statements of that type if the intent of the parties, 
viewed objectively, can be gleaned from the language used. 
The standard of interpretation of unintegrated agreements 
is set out in 1 Restatement of Contracts, § 233 as follows: 
Where there is no integration, words or other man-
ifestations of intention forming an agreement, or 
having reference to the formation of an agreement, 
are given the meaning which the party making the 
manifestation should reasonably expect that the 
other party would give them * * * 
Under the provisions of 1 Restatement of Contracts, 
§ 231, the rule of interpretation applies to integrated 
agreements, also, where they are ambiguous or uncertain. 
It is difficult to conceive how any reasonable, objec-
tive, person could read the endorsement placed on the check 
by the defendant without coming the conclusion that the 
defendant intended that if the check were cashed, all dis-
putes and claims as between the parties would be fully 
compromised and settled. The language is quite unlike that 
in Hintze v. Seaich where a check was sent to the plaintiff 
with a statement that "this is the balance of your account 
in full." That statement can be interpreted as a simple 
statement of expectation by the one party, but not clearly 
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a statement that the check is tendered only on condition 
that it be accepted in full settlement. The endorsement 
placed on the checks in this case by the defendant cannot be' 
interpreted in any other way. "Endorsement * * * consti-
tutes final and full payment * * * in settlement of any and 
all obligations due me from Stevens-Henager College." How 
could it be clearer? 
Moreover, the evidence is that the plaintiffs knew 
exactly what the contracts meant. In holding the contrary, 
the court relies upon the findings of the trial court, but 
pays no attention to the testimony of the plaintiffs. The 
addition of modifying language by two of the plaintiffs is 
pretty clear evidence that they knew what the defendant was 
saying. Two of the plaintiffs changed the language on the 
endorsement, the other one endorsed the check and presented 
it for payment believing that he had additional claims for 
commissions against the defendant (Tr. 229). Mr. Teeples 
testified that he took the endorsement to be an attempt on 
the part of Stevens to wipe out the sums of future commissions 
(Tr. 189). 
Accordingly we not only have a situation in which the 
language used by the defendant was clear and unequivocal, but 
one in which the plaintiffs who cashed the checks understood 
what the defendant was saying, understood it as defendant 
understood it, and should be bound by it. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because the case was erroneously decided, the court mis-
conceived the facts, and because one of the justices who 
participated in the decision did not hear the oral argument, 
a re-hearing should be granted and the judgment of the trial 
court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
8H«e E. Roe (Signadj 
Bryce E. Roe 
ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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